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1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the impact of globalized accounting and economic reforms on the 
public sectors of the Global South, focusing particularly on the countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Over the last three decades, people living in these countries have experienced debt 
crises, civil wars, coups and, on top of all that, externally imposed neoliberal economic 
reforms. Accounting has been an integral part of those imposed 'reforms'. 
International creditor institutions and donor agencies have promoted new public 
management (NPM) reforms in all developing countries (Ayeni, 2002). The central fea-
tures ofNPM have been said to include: a shift in emphasis from process accountability 
(input controls and bureaucratic procedures, rules and standards) to accountability for 
results (quantifiable outcomes, measures and performance targets); and devolution of 
management control, coupled with the development of improved reporting, monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms (Awio, Lawrence and Northcott, 2007). The claimed 
benefits of such reforms include improvements in efficiency, effectiveness and account-
ability of the public sector. Universally, the reforms were expected to engender greater 
public service responsiveness and increased choice of providers of services, private 
as well as public (Olson, Guthrie and Humphrey, 1998). However, we argue that the 
results indicate that the global reforms have not necessarily met the needs of the local 
populations who have had to endure them. 
After stripping away activities that could be privatized, the remaining core gov-
ernment services were the targets of better financial management. Two of the most 
frequently recommended tools of public financial management for developing countries 
are the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) and integrated financial manage-
ment information systems (IFMIS). We examine the design, implementation and use of 
these global remedies, whose introduction we argue was based on theoretical assump-
tions as opposed to experience of their effects. We note the growing concern that is being 
expressed about the effectiveness of such interventions. 
We illustrate that the reforms in accounting procedures in central government have been 
less successful than anticipated. The use of expensive external consultants at the expense 
oflocal experts is discussed. We conclude with some lessons for a way forward, suggesting 
greater reliance be placed on local expertise, which needs to be nourished. 
Before solutions can be assessed we have to understand the problem and how it 
arose. For this reason, this chapter provides some background on the financial plight 
of the governments in the Global South, and argues that there may be a widespread 
misconception about the causal nature of their predicaments. Typically it is assumed 
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that the poverty and lack of economic growth in these countries were the result of the 
poor administration and public financial practices. In our view, the causal direction may 
have been in the opposite direction. It is argued below that it was economic decline and 
poverty that caused poor administration and financial management and encouraged cor-
ruption. If this was indeed the case, the use of foreign consultants to introduce large-scale 
'modern' reforms may have accentuated the problem. This approach may have further 
undermined the confidence of local managers and so reduced their ability to ensure that 
the local environment was fully considered. We argue that the reforms needed the full 
involvement of local public financial managers in the rebuilding of their systems and 
institutions, ensuring that the reforms had a good fit with associated systems and were 
fully owned and understood by local officials. The involvement of local officials is par-
ticularly important with accounting reforms, where the information produced hasto be 
fully appreciated if it is to be used effectively. 
2. BACKGROUND TO THE LARGE LEVELS OF DEBT 
The argument in this section is that the causal relationship runs contrary to the con-
ventional view. Economic problems (originating from external events) led to the 
deterioration in the quality of governance and public financial management in many 
Mrican countries. The international financial institutions and bilateral aid agencies used 
the crises to introduce wide-ranging public sector financial management reforms, for 
example the MTEF and IFMIS. They also unsuccessfully argued for the adoption of 
international public sector accounting standards and performance audit. 
2.1 The Origins of the Global South's Debt Burden 
In the first few years after independence the economies of many Mrican countries grew 
significantly and so their governments could afford to expand public services dramatic-
ally, especially for health and education. With the first major oil price rises in 1973-74, 
funds were readily available for these countries to borrow for significant public invest-
ment programmes. 
Not surprisingly, then, many countries concentrated on Big Projects - showpiece government 
development projects that could be the motor for economic transformation, such as Ghana's 
Volta River Project, which involved construction of the Akosombo Dam in the early 1960s to 
form the world's largest artificial lake and building aluminium smelters to take advantage of the 
country's bauxite resources. (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004, p.16) 
The experience of the US and UK in the years following the Second World War had 
shown that extensive government borrowing could facilitate economic growth. In the US 
the federal debt alone (excluding state or local government debt) reached over 120 per 
cent of GDP in 1946 (Office of Management and Budget, 2007) and in the UK govern-
ment debt peaked at nearly 250 per cent of GOP (Clark and Dilnot, 2002) at around the 
same time. The sustained economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s meant that these levels 
of debt were sustainable, could be accommodated and were eventually repaid. In addi-
tion, inflation did not reach double figures in the UK until the mid-1970s. 
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However, most governments of the Global South were not so lucky. In 1979-80 
further oil price rises increased the price of their imports. Around the same time, in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s the United States raised interest rates to nearly 20 per cent in a 
battle to throttle back its persistent inflation (Stiglitz, 2006). The real (inflation-adjusted) 
interest rates paid by the Global South increased from -4 per cent in 1975 to almost +4 
per cent a decade later (Bond, 2006). 
A strategy for development, based on indebtedness ... was suddenly transformed into an 
actual catastrophe by a decision emanating from a fraction of ruling classes within leading capi-
talist countries, with a total indifference for the hardship imposed on the third world (as well as 
for the rise of unemployment everywhere). (Dumenil and Levy, 2005) 
The rapid increase in world interest rates in the early 1980s on top of the oil price rises 
led to a world recession. As a result most countries in the Global South faced a reduced 
demand for their exports whilst having to pay much higher interest rates on their debts. 
As Christian Aid (2003, p.22) reported: 
the prices Third World countries receive for many of their traditional exports, from coffee and 
cocoa to rice, sugar, and cotton, continue to decline. The relative value of their exports has 
declined even more - for example, in 1975 a new tractor cost the equivalent of 8 metric tons of 
African coffee, but by 1990 the same tractor cost 40 metric tons. 
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2005) estimated 
that, if commodity prices had maintained the same real value as in 1980, the Global 
South would be earning an additional $112 billion in annual export revenues, which was 
double the then level of their aid receipts. Putting it another way, between 1970 and 1997 
changes in the terms of trade cost non-oil-producing African states (excluding South 
Africa) a total of 119 per cent of their annual GDP, according to the World Bank (2000). 
External debt grew by 106 per cent ofGDP over the same period. So all the external debt 
of African countries at the end of the twentieth century could be explained by falling 
prices for their exports and increasing prices of imports - both changes over which their 
governments had little or no control. 
As UNCTAD (2004, p. 5) describes the result: 
From just over $11 billion in 1970, Mrica had accumulated over $120 billion of external debt 
in the midst of the external shocks ofthe early 1980s. Total external debt then worsened signifi-
cantly during the period of structural adjustment in the 1980s and early 1990s, reaching a peak 
of about $340 billion in 1995. 
In the same report UNCTAD calculates that between 1970 and 2002 Sub-Saharan 
Africa received $294 billion in loans, and paid back $268 billion in debt service, but was 
left with debts of some $210 billion (2004, p. 9). 
Mrica now repays more than it receives. In 1980, loan inflows of$9.6 billion were comfortably 
higher than the debt repayment outflow of $3.2 billion ... by 2000, only $3.2 billion flowed in, 
and $9.8 billion was repaid, leaving a net financial flows deficit of $6.2 billion ... By the early 
2000s, the debt remained unbearable for at least 21 Mrican countries at more than 300 per cent 
of export earnings. (Bond, 2006, p. 39) 
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The solution to the indebtedness envisioned by the World Bank and other interna-
tional development agencies was the introduction of NPM reforms in all developing 
countries. The claimed benefits of such reforms included improvements in efficiency, 
effectiveness and accountability of the public sector. 
3. NEED FOR AND DESIGN OF 'MODERN' FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
The high and unsustainable levels of debt in many developing countries were thus due 
to external economic events beyond the control of their governments. However, what-
ever its origin, this debt forced governments to approach the IMF and the World Bank 
for support. The debt burden gave the World Bank and IMF the leverage needed to 
implement policies of deregulation and privatization through structural adjustment 
programmes. These almost invariably included the following elements: 
• reduced government spending and greater fiscal discipline to control inflation; 
• removing import controls and restrictions on capital movements; 
• privatization of state enterprises; 
• devaluation of the currency; 
• making labour more flexible by reducing legal protection, food subsidies and 
minimum wages. 
As Colin Leys described, the dominant view became that: 
Governments were part of the problem, not part of the solution; they were inefficient and 
often corrupt and hence parasitic, not stimulators of growth. The solution was to privatize the 
public sector, reduce the scale and scope of government spending and give up all policies, from 
exchange rate controls to subsidies and redistributive taxation, that altered any prices that 
would otherwise be set by the impersonal forces of the market. (Leys, 1996, p. 18) 
As well as greater fiscal discipline, privatization of previously state-run organizations, 
in industries such as telecommunications, postal services, shipping, forestry and water 
supplies, was encouraged. 
Mter stripping away activities that could be privatized, the remaining core govern-
ment services were the targets of better financial management. Modern tools of public 
financial management were imported to governments of the Global South. These tools 
were the MTEF and IFMIS. We will examine the design rationality and claims made 
for each of these techniques, then their implementation using overseas consultants, and 
finally their limitations and outcomes. 
Although MTEFs differ across countries, broadly defined the MTEF approach is a 
means for linking policy, planning and bUdgeting. The time horizon for government 
budgeting was to be extended from the traditional annual budget to the medium term, 
usually three years. Simultaneously, budgetary control was to move from agreeing 
resource inputs to providing the resources necessary for agreed outputs and, ideally, 
outcomes. An MTEF consists of a 'top-down resource envelope, a bottom-up estimation 
I I 
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of the current and medium-term costs of existing policy and, ultimately, the matching of 
these costs with available resources' (World Bank, 1998, p.48). The aim of the system 
was that government ministries would have increased predictability of resource flows 
over the next few years, and improved accountability and transparency for the level of 
services they provided in addition to the resources they consumed, and that this would 
ultimately lead to a more effective and efficient process of resource allocation towards 
strategic priorities within and between sectors. 
The generic objectives of an MTEF are generally considered to be: 
• facilitating the achievement of a balanced budget (fiscal discipline); 
• enabling the shift of resources to pro-poor areas of the budget in line with agreed 
poverty reduction strategies. 
Another major reform which the World Bank and other donors have heavily pro-
moted across the public sectors of the Global South is the concept of an IFMIS. This is a 
computerized system designed to support public expenditure management goals and pri-
orities across the whole of government. An IFMIS 'usually refers to computerization of 
public expenditure management processes, including budget formulation, budget execu-
tion, and accounting, with the help of a fully integrated system for financial management 
of the line ministries and other spending agencies' (Diamond and Khemani, 2005, p. 3). 
By tracking financial events through automated financial operations, governments 
are expected to be able to control expenditure better and improve transparency and 
accountability in the budget cycle as a whole. While definitions of the key components of 
an IFMIS vary, proponents argue that this technology provides a set of tools that assist 
government in undertaking the following tasks: 
• designing appropriate fiscal and monetary responses to changing macroeconomic 
conditions; 
• ensuring accountability for the deployment and use of public resources; 
• improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure programmes; 
• mobilizing domestic resources and managing external resources (foreign aid and 
loans); 
• managing civil services; and 
• decentralizing operations with adequate controls. 
The aim of an IFMIS is to integrate all aspects of the government's budgetary cycle and 
provide suitable interfaces to other systems and entities. Thus an IFMIS may be based 
on the generic model shown in Figure 11.1. 
An integrated treasury system offers several significant benefits in managing public 
monies more effectively: 
• Full integration of budget and budget execution data, thereby allowing greater financial 
control; 
• Improved planning for cash as well as close and timely monitoring of the government's 
cash position; 
• Provision of adequate management reporting at various levels of budget execution; 
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• Improvement of data quality for the preparation and execution of the budget; and 
• Facilitation of the preparation of financial statements and other financial reports for 
budgeting, analysis and financial control. (Hashim and Allan, 200 I) 
The hope of reformers was that the MTEF and IFMIS technologies would support 
the modernization.of public financial management and the introduction of good govern-
ance. However, as considered in the following sections, the necessary preconditions for 
these complex reforms were not necessarily available, and the use of foreign consultants 
accentuated the problem of a lack of local capacity. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION - AND THE (MISSING) NECESSARY 
PRECONDITIONS 
The successful introduction of these new technologies is dependent upon certain pre-
conditions. These preconditions were not generally in place in the public sectors of 
the Global South. In addition to the traditional requirement of budget discipline, the 
following technical and institutional factors are considered essential for a successful 
MTEF: 
• a clear framework of national objectives and policies, and sector objectives and strategies 
• realistic mediumcterm resource projections that ensures predictable flows of programmed 
resources to implementing agencies 
• a comprehensive budget that captures all the expenditures by the government as well as 
on behalf of the government, for instance by donors and NGOs 
• an integrated budget that enables the budget system to relate results and accountabilities 
to resource inputs 
• a budget and program classification that can be linked to the national and sectoral objec-
tives, that is a functional clas,sification and facilitates the integration of the budget 
• financial management institutions to ensure transparency and accountability in the use 
of budget resources 
• monitorable indicators of inputs, final and intermediate outputs and outcomes, quantita-
tive and qualitative targets of these indicators and a system for regular monitoring of the 
progress toward meeting the targets. The monitoring provides the basis to assess results 
and accountabilities and make adjustments in objectives, targets and budget allocations. 
(World Bank, 2005, p. 8) 
Two questions over the implementation of the MTEF are the extent to which objec-
tives have been formally agreed for the country concerned, and whether these have been 
agreed by all the major stakeholders. Questions may also be raised about whether these 
objectives were internally generated to address local concerns and priorities or whether 
they were based on external advice, recommendations or requirements. 
Similarly there are preconditions necessary for the successful implementation of 
an IFMIS. Preconditions for developing an IFMIS have been claimed to include the 
following: 
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• Authorities' commitment and ownership is clear 
Clear institutional designation 
Clear authority to implement 
Active involvement, with no undue delegation to suppliers 
• Preconditions are ready for reform 
Authorities prepared to reengineer work practices 
Environment encourages reform 
Sufficient skills and/or training available 
Users are 'sold' on the system 
Steering group is active and representative 
• Project design is sound 
Adequate time taken on design phase 
Users fully involved in specification 
Not too ambitious in scope 
Timetable is realistic 
• Management of project is capable 
Adequate management skills 
Managers motivated to reform 
Full-time implementation team identified 
In-house or outsourced maintenance capacity identified, in place, and properly costed 
• Adequate resources are assured 
Sufficient funds since actual costs might exceed anticipated cost 
Resource demands caused by operating two parallel systems simultaneously 
Sufficient resources for long-term operation and maintenance ofthe system 
(Diamond and Khemani, 2005) 
4.1 Implementation Issues: Consultants and Expertise 
Private sector international consultants have been called upon widely to assist with 
the implementation of IFMIS, MTEF and other major public financial management 
reforms in the Global South. The nature of these reforms means that knowledge and 
experience are not available locally. So, for example, almost invariably, IFMIS projects 
will be unique in the country concerned, at least in the public sector. Thus the use of 
international consultants will usually be considered essential. 
However, the success of such large-scale reforms is also dependent upon a detailed 
understanding of the local environment, existing systems and institutions. This is only 
available from local public financial management officials. As a result, to be successful, 
such reforms require close co-operation, understanding and mutual respect between 
these two sets of experts, the local officials and international consultants. 
However, the consultancy firms are usually major companies, and so the relation-
ship between the client government officials and the consultants is not a relationship 
between equals. The budgets of consultancy firms, for example, often outstrip those of 
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the countries in which they work. PricewaterhouseCoopers, for example, recorded a 
total revenue of US$26.2 billion for its 2009 financial year- a figure that far outstrips 
the GDP of any country in Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of Nigeria and South 
Africa (www.pwc.com). In addition, the international consultancy firms have access to 
more information about actual successes and challenges that other governments have 
experienced with their MTEF and IFMIS reforms (they may also have relationships with 
suppliers ofIT equipment or software). 
As a result, the local knowledge, experience and detailed appreciation of the local gov-
ernment officials are not necessarily used effectively. Capacity development is often a key 
dimension of such large-scale projects. However, the use of international experts may 
have the effect of further demoralizing local officials, undermining their self-confidence 
and so actually reducing their capacity. As a result some research has highlighted the 
risk of dependency on consultants; for example, Fyson (2009), based on research into the 
introduction of an IFMIS in Ghana, outlined the dilemma as follows: 
Some of the literature focuses on the work of contractors as a necessary contribution to the 
development effort bringing both resources and expertise to assist in building local capacity 
... In contrast, other scholars, have argued that the work of consultants funded by develop-
ment agencies, almost by definition, will have a nefarious impact on the longer-term prospects 
for development (Berg 1993, Reality of Aid 1999, Easterly 2002). Mter all, how can private 
sector consultants earning many times their counterpart's salary assist the public sectors oflow 
income and aid dependent countries (Wedel 1998, Jones 1997)? Instead expatriate consultants 
and advisors are perceived as a systematic destructive force which is undermining the develop-
ment of capacity in Africa. 
In the UK, private sector consultants are also used extensively to advise public sector 
officials, but the relationship between the two partners is far more equal. Despite this, the 
National Audit Office (UK, 2006) identified the following recommendations to ensure 
the more effective use of consultants: 
1. Public bodies need to be much better at identifying where core skill gaps exist in rela-
tion to medium- and long-term programme requirements. This knowledge should be 
used to plan for recruitment, training, and using consultants. Recruitment of full-
time personnel and training of existing personnel can provide better value for money 
than continued use of consultants. 
2. Public bodies should start with the presumption that their own staff are best fitted 
for their requirements. While it will often be the case that they need to purchase spe-
cific expertise from consulting firms, more generalist requirements can be met more 
cost-effectively by internal resources. 
3. Public bodies should adhere to agreed regulations on the recommended thresh-
old levels requiring rilinisterial or permanent secretary approval of consultancy 
contracts. Approvals should be based on a robust business case. Adhering to the 
guidance will ensure that senior management has full sight of the larger consulting 
contracts, promoting better accountability for this spend. 
4. Public bodies need to engage with the market earlier to explore a range of possible 
approaches and contracting methods. Early contact with suppliers during the pro-
curement process improves both the supplier's and the client's understanding of the 
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requirement. Public bodies would get more tailored and innovative responses to 
their invitations to tender. 
S. Public bodies should make more use of different payment mechanisms such as 
fixed price and incentivized contracts instead of the standard time and materials. 
Different payment mechanisms can help control costs and formalize the joint objec-
tives between clients and consultants. The different payment options require a strong 
understanding of the project's objectives, scope, risks and approach. 
6. Public bodies must be smarter when it comes to understanding how consulting 
firms operate and in sharing information about their performance. Public bodies 
should have regular, senior-level discussions with their consultants to discuss openly 
medium- to long-term objectives and plans. Public bodies should also use their 
understanding of suppliers' objectives to maximize their purchasing advantage. 
Public bodies need to have a clear understanding of who their key suppliers are, how 
they are organized, their incentive mechanisms (which might focus on selling further 
work), and commercial practices. 
7. Public bodies need to provide sufficient incentive to staff to make the consultancy 
project a success. Recent research has shown that the further removed people are 
from the decision to use consultants the more likely they are to feel confused about 
project responsibilities and accountabilities and frustrated because they don't know 
what the consultants are doing, to complain of poor communication and to be 
cynical about the consultants' involvement. 
4.2 Lack of Local Capability: Worsening Pay and Conditions for Public Sector 
Workers 
The use of expensive external consultants has to be understood in the context of what was 
happening to the economies and working conditions of local populations. The general 
deterioration in the economic conditions across the Global South led to a significant 
reduction in the real pay of public sector workers and so had a detrimental effect on the 
quality of public financial management across much of the Global South. Their public 
sectors were downsized and wage levels deteriorated significantly, leading to problems of 
loss of skills and capacity. 
Efficient, accountable, adequately paid and well-motivated civil servants are essential for an 
effective public sector, and especially to implement relatively complex reforms such as an 
MTEF or an IFMIS. Civil service reform was a major component of structural adjustment 
lending in the 1980s and the 1990s. Yet for the World Bank and IMF, such reforms primarily 
meant reducing the size of the civil service. At the same time, structural adjustment programmes 
led to a large decline in wages for civil servants who remained (Hawley, 2000). 
The IMF, for example, prompted wage reductions averaging 14 per cent in 20 African coun-
tries in the 19908 (Lienert and Modi, 1997: 18). The use of outside experts, funded by technical 
assistance loans, may also have hampered the growth of local expertise and capacity (Rama, 
1997: 2) and demoralized the existing local professional staff, thereby adversely affecting their 
ability to successfully implement such complex reforms. (Wynne, 2005, pp. 31-2) 
Real wages in nearly every African country were estimated to have fallen between SO and 
60 per cent since the imposition of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s 
(ILO/JASPA, 1991). 
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By 1990 Margaret Joan Anstee, the UN under-secretary-general, could warn that: 
The impact of recession and adjustment in the 1980s has been dealt with by economists and 
policy makers, within a framework of macro-analysis that pays scant attention to the people 
directly caught up in these economic events. These trends were inexorably leading to an 
ominous deterioration of sub-Saharan Mrica's scarce human capital, which can be replaced 
only at great cost. They were setting the stage for an accelerated spiral of decline in the conti-
nent's future development. (Quoted in Brown, 1995, p.266) 
Public sector workers were not immune and in many cases suffered from reduced pay 
and greater insecurity. This was the result of reduced government income, but also con-
ditionality requirements from the World Bank and the IMF. The result was that, from 
the early 1980s to the early 1990s, the number of people employed by central government 
in Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 1.8 per cent to 1.1 per cent of the population, and the 
average government wage also fell from 6.1 times per capita GDP to 4.8 times (Schiavo-
Campo, de Tommaso and Mukherjee, 1997). In Anglophone Africa, public sector wages 
declined by as much as 80 per cent in real terms between the early1970s and the early 
1980s (Ayee, 2005). 
Uganda provides one of the most vivid examples, with pay for civil servants in the late 
1980s falling to only $10 a month (Kiragu and Mukandala, 2005). A reform programme 
was launched in 1993 which halved the number of public servants through the reduction 
in ghost workers, a voluntary redundancy scheme and a selective freeze on recruitment. 
Although this was coupled with significant salary increases in the early 1990s, the objec-
tive of a minimum living wage for Ugandan civil servants is far from being realized 
according to Mark Robinson, who concludes that: 
Failure to make progress on pay reform for the vast majority of public servants contributes 
to declining motivation. Large differentials between administrative grades and top civil serv-
ants, along with special treatment for senior officials in the political bureaucracy and semi-
autonomous bodies like the URA, fuel resentment, undermine morale and provide a stimulus 
to corruption. The lack of incentives for public servants who have to cope with continuous 
reform initiatives and future uncertainty further runs counter to a key objective of the reform 
programme as set out by the 1991 presidential commission, namely the creation of a committed, 
responsible and results-oriented civil service, which would be better paid, more efficient, and 
have more effective staff. (Robinson, 2006) 
Similarly, in 2002, Charles Byaruhanga could conclude that in Uganda: 
Public sector pay has improved over the last decade though pay reform remains on the public 
sector institutional agenda. Pay for managerial, technical and professional civil service remains 
un-competitive, leading to difficulties in recruiting and retaining competent staff and also 
negatively impacting on public service delivery. ' : 
A more recent example of the effect of economic collapse on the salaries of public offi-
cials is Liberia, where salaries of civil servants fell to a range of only $30 to $55 per month 
(Kumar and Brar, 2008). Many experienced and qualified staff left the public service 
and the country. This loss of human resources contributed to the major breakdown of 
government systems. 
The poor pay and conditions in the African public sector has been matched by the 
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attraction of working in developed countries: 'Approximately 20,000 skilled workers 
leave Africa each year. The World Bank's estimate of the share of Africa's skilled 
workers with a tertiary education who emigrate is more than 15 per cent, higher than 
any other region' (Bond, 2006, p. 89). In these circumstances, the loss of key public sector 
financial managers has led to the greater use of foreign consultants. However, the success 
of especially large-scale reforms like IFMIS and MTEF is dependent on the existence of 
local experts who are able to engage critically with these international consultants. The 
loss of this local knowledge and experience meant the strengths and challenges of existing 
systems are not adequately understood and so the linkages between the new and existing 
systems are not optimized. In addition, the absence of such local expertise has meant that 
the sustainability of the reforms has not been possible. 
5. USE AND CRITICISMS OF THE REFORMS 
Despite the great claims made for the benefits of financial management reforms, the 
outcomes have often been disappointing. Many of the presumed benefits have been 
based more on theory and what should happen after the reforms have worked their way 
through the system. These reforms continue to be heavily supported by the international 
financial institutions and the country aid agencies. However, the 'actual level of success 
from their implementation has been surprisingly low. In many cases, where results have 
not lived up to expectations, this is not laid at the door of the "reforms" but rather at 
the door of the governments who have not gone far enough, or have backed off under 
pressure from "vested interests'" (Rosskam, 2006, p. ix). And the Danish Institute for 
International Studies says: 'blue-print approaches and fixed ideas about what consti-
tutes a governance agenda can have dangerous consequences, and they demonstrate 
how pragmatic initiatives that do not necessarily reflect widespread ideas about "good 
governance" can bring about positive results' (http://www.diis.dk/sw66424.asp). 
This need for a fundamental review of actual progress is supported by a former senior 
official of the World Bank, who said that: 
The introduction of the MTEF concept and its early application are now some 15 years old, and 
the time for a candid and fact-based assessment is long overdue. Given the hype the MTEF has 
enjoyed, its rapid expansion in the last decade, and the disregard of some fundamental consid-
erations of institutions and capacity, a little extra emphasis in the interest of understanding the 
actual issues is timely. (Schiavo-Campo, 2008) 
In 2005 one of the authors of this chapter (Wynne, 2005) reviewed the progress with 
implementation of MTEF and IFMIS reforms in Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda . 
The introduction of the MTEF in Ghana appeared to have been an example of con-
sultants and aid agencies encouraging the adoption of multi-year budgeting based on 
the limited experience in similar countries. This reform was thought to have been over-
ambitious, as in recent years Ghana had been struggling to implement its agreed annual 
budget. 
The Tanzanian MTEF was considered to be one of the most comprehensive in Africa 
(Le Houerou and Taliercio, 2002). But its success, as measured against the support for 
fiscal balance and in promoting the reallocation of financial resources to finance poverty 
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eradication programmes, appears to have been rather limited. Although spending in the 
priority poverty reducing areas seemed to have increased more than in other areas of the 
government's budget, this increase had been relatively modest. 
The Ugandan MTEF was considered to be one of the best examples of the success 
of the initiative in Africa. The introduction of an MTEF was certainly associated with 
improved macroeconomic stability, although it is difficult to prove the causal relation-
ship. However, this reform has not focused on shifting funds towards poverty reduction 
activities. All areas of expenditure benefited equally from increased absolute funding 
during the implementation of the MTEF. Education, which is one of the priority 
areas, grew marginally, but its share in the overall government expenditure remained 
unchanged over the period of five years during which the MTEF was implemented. 
In terms of the IFMIS, this had not been successful in Ghana. Agreed in 1997, it was 
re-Iaunched in 2004, and a new project was started in mid-20l0 to try to provide an inte-
grated financial system for the central government. 
In Tanzania, the IFMIS has been successful in terms of providing timely financial 
management information and improving commitment control. However, this only 
covered central government units in Dar es Salaam; budgetary information had to be re-
entered once the annual budget was agreed; and the system was not linked to either the 
payroll or the revenue system. Despite these limitations, several other African countries 
have adopted the same approach as the Tanzanian government, including Malawi and 
The Gambia. 
Uganda was at the pilot stage of a large and complex project to provide an integrated 
computer platform and financial system for the whole of central and at least the larger 
local governments. The project had suffered only limited delays relative to the original 
timetable. However, the risks are still considered to be significant. 
This study of the implementation of MTEF- and IFMIS-type reforms in these three 
African countries (Wynne, 2005) concluded that: 
given the past record oflimited success with the implementation of MTEFs, IFMISs and other 
major reforms, the need for such approaches and the evidence of their successful implementa-
tion in other countries should be rigorously reviewed. The traditional public sector concerns 
with regularity and probity will, if anything, become more important when major reform 
initiatives are being considered. SmaIl-scale investment in basic internal financial controls may 
often bring greater returns than large investment in innovative reforms with their associated 
significant risks of failure. 
MTEFs and IFMISs are considered, at least by the international financial institutions to 
be core public financial management reforms for many developing countries. Their level of 
success, however, has been relatively modest and many of the assumed benefits have not neces-
sarily been achieved. As a result, scarce resources and expertise may have been wasted on initia-
tives whose success in practice had not necessarily been adequately tested. (Wynne 2005, p. 32) 
Both the MTEF and the IFMIS are large, complex and strategic reforms and so are 
high-risk projects that have actually suffered high levels of failure. Thus, for example, 
World Bank staff have estimated that only 6 per cent of the IFMISs they funded were 
highly likely to be sustainable (Dorotinsky, 2003). However, it is the strategic nature of 
these reforms which can be attractive to those who believe that the public sector in the 
Global South requires fundamental change. 
A former IMF and W orId Bank official admitted that: 
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A first glimmer of recognition of these problems [with the MTEF] appeared at the World 
Bank's 'PREM Week' meeting of late 2000, when it was noted, among other things, that if a 
country cannot put together a sensible annual budget and execute it in minimally acceptable 
fashion it is very unlikely to have any use for a medium-term expenditure framework. One 
panellist (Alister Moon) gave a long list of preconditions for introducing an MTEF, including 
macroeconomic stability; revenue predictability; early political commitment; core capacity of 
the finance ministry and central agencies; supportive donor behaviour; capacity to enforce a 
hard budget constraint at the ministry level; executive commitment to having a transparent 
budget process; and capacity in sector policy analysis. (Schiavo-Campo, 2008, p. 5) 
Despite these warnings of implementation difficulties, and the calls for country-led 
reforms, the international financial institutions and aid agencies still have a dominant 
role in the direction of public financial management, and MTEFs and IFMISs are still 
being heavily promoted as the way to improve and to modernize public sector financial 
management across Africa. 
5.1 Sustainability of the Systems - Expensive General System Failures 
There were great expectations for the MTEF and IFMIS reforms, but they have often 
failed in practice. The results of nearly 15 years of experience of introducing the MTEF 
across the Global South have been summarized by a former senior IMF and World Bank 
official as: 
• virtually no evidence of improved macroeconomic balance 
• some limited evidence of reallocation to priority subsectors 
• no evidence of a link to greater budgetary predictability 
• no evidence of efficiency gains in spending. 
This is what the donors and the developing and middle-income countries have got in return for 
the billions of aid dollars, mountains of red tape, heavy burdens on local government staff, and 
literally centuries of full-time-equivalent technical experts. (Schiavo-Campo, 2008, p. 6) 
And 'there is mounting skepticism of all MTEF concepts - seen as exhausting and 
expensive initiatives pushed by donors, and carried out as supply-driven self-propelled 
exercises conducted mainly by external consultants' (Schiavo-Campo, 2008, p. 7). 
In addition, Allen Schick, a frequent presenter at World Bank public financial man-
agement events, has commented: 'Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) 
have not proven a panacea to the challenges of budget planning, preparation and 
management in most countries. A possible epitaph for MTEF-type reforms would read 
"Died of many causes, each of which was sufficient'" (Schick, 2008). 
These problems have been known for years. In a major study for the World Bank, Le 
Houerou and Taliercio (2002) came to the following conclusions on the progress with the 
introduction of the MTEF across Africa: 
The limited quantitative evidence shows, thus far, that MTEFs are not yet unambiguously 
associated with their objectives ... In terms of macroeconomic balance, with the possible 
exception of Uganda, there is no evidence that MTEFs have made a significant impact. In terms 
of resource allocation, there is some limited and qualified evidence to suggest that MTEFs are 
linked to reallocations to a subset of priority sectors. With respect to budgetary predictability 
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and consistency, there is no support for the assumption that MTEFs are associated with greater 
discipline and less deviation. At best, then, these cases present a mixed picture. (Le Houerou 
and Taliercio, 2002, p. 24) 
At a major World Bank seminar to re-assess its public financial supported reforms, 
including a review of its experience with the MTEF, one official commented: 'The 
realization of the magnitude of wasted resources and dashed expectations is sobering' 
(Schiavo-Campo, 2008). 
Another of the presenters at this event asked: 'Have certain donor-led PFM [public 
financial management] initiatives complicated the PFM reform landscape in countries, 
eg MTEF?', and a World Bank staff member said that MTEFs had become a reputa-
tional risk to the Bank. It is hoped that these reviews will lead to greater changes in prac-
tice and advice to governments. It seemed clear that the World Bank needs to put more 
effort into listening to local public sector financial officials, building on their expertise 
and understanding of the local environment to ensure that local public sector financial 
management reform programmes are more successful in future. 
Large-scale electronic information system implementations are notoriously risky. The 
hope in respect of governments of the Global South was that they could benefit from the 
lessons of failed implementations in the developed world. In practice, this seems not to 
have been the case. The following three quotations indicate the huge gulf between the 
hype and the reality of IT reforms: 
In the emerging knowledge-based economy of the 21st century, information and communica-
tions technology will likely assume an importance that dwarfs other types of infrastructure. 
This shift offers Africa a chance to leapfrog intermediate stages of development by avoiding 
costly investments in time, resources, and the generation and use of knowledge. Africa has 
a chance to benefit not only as a consumer in the new knowledge economy, but also as a 
producer. It cannot afford to miss this opportunity. (World Bank, 2000, p. 153) 
E-governrnent is difficult to implement, hard to manage and often fails. (Heeks, 2006, p. 10) 
Survey and poll results produce the following working estimates about e-government initiatives 
in developing/transitional countries: 
• 35% are total failures 
• 50% are partial failures 
• 15% are successes. (eGov for Development, 2007) 
IFMIS in particular and IT in general have been promoted as providing the key 
answers to improving the quality and efficiency of a modem public sector. However, the 
reality has been a series of failed projects and, in many cases, the wastage of millions of 
dollars which are desperately needed for investment in many other areas of the public 
sector. 
In Ghana, for example, an IFMIS was launched in 1997 by Vice-President Mills. He 
argued that the IFMIS would: 
not only facilitate budget execution, accounting and financial reporting but will also place 
responsibility on the Ministers to monitor and account for resource use .. . the policies we 
formulate, the programmes we implement, the resources we use, must all be accounted for in 
term: 
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terms of the extent to which they help us improve our living standards. (PUFMARP newsletter, 
September 1997, pp.4-5, quoted in Fyson, 2009) 
However, nearly a decade later, in May 2006, the deputy controller and accountant 
general noted that: 'there has as yet not been one Cedi [local currency] benefit from it. I 
have not used [IF MIS] to generate one report yet' (quoted in Fyson, 2009). 
This experience has also been replicated in industrial countries. An important book 
(Gauld, Goldfinch and Dale 2006) reviews a number of IT case studies in Australia, 
Britain, New Zealand and the United States. As a result, the authors reach the conclu-
sion that IT is a dangerous enthusiasm. In contrast they argue that pessimism, or at least 
the expectation of failure, should be the guiding principle. 
These conclusions appear to be even more relevant and important in Africa, where the 
experience has, if anything, been worse in terms of the risk of IT failure, as the following 
quotations demonstrate: 'the evidence does all point in one direction: towards high rates 
of e-government project failure in Africa' (Heeks, 2002, p.ll); 'information systems fail 
or under perform more often than they succeed in the public sector in Africa' (peterson, 
1998, p.38); 'the success rate of introduced information technology systems in African 
state agencies has been distressingly low' (Berman and Tettey, 2001, p. 2). 
One of the reasons for this high failure rate is that the economics of IT investment in 
Africa is different from that found in industrial countries. In Africa, labour is relatively 
cheap, IT hardware and skills are not available locally, and transport costs make IT 
more expensive to purchase and to maintain. Average public sector wage costs in Africa 
can be one-tenth or less of those in industrial countries. Average IT costs, in contrast, 
may be two to three times higher. E-governance and automation using modern IT tech-
nology therefore result in replacing cheap civil servants with costly IT (Heeks, 2002). 
In late 2003, Bill Dorotinsky provided a useful overview of the World Bank's experi-
ence of providing over $1 billion to finance IFMIS projects over 17 years. The average 
time for completion of each project was over nine years for African projects, and the 
average cost of each of the 34 projects worldwide was $12.3 million (Dorotinsky, 2003). 
If success is defined on the basis of being on budget, on time and delivered as planned, 
then only 21 per cent of these projects were successful. An even gloomier view was pro-
vided by assessments of the same projects by the World Bank staff. A quarter of the 
projects were considered unsustainable, 69 per cent likely to be sustainable and only 6 
per cent highly likely to be sustainable, and this figure was lower for Africa than other 
regions (Dorotinsky, 2003). 
Dorotinsky stated that the general lesson from the World Bank's experience was 
the requirement to have clear political commitment and ownership by the borrowing 
country. He also pointed out that such schemes were generally less successful in poorer 
countries and highlighted the following additional risks: 
• Lack of capacity 
• Lack of government commitment 
• Too many project components 
• Opposition by staff and line ministries (Dorotinsky, 2003). 
In 2005 the IMF published a working paper which investigates the reason for the serious 
delays and frequent failure to implement and sustain IFMIS reforms in governments of 
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the Global South (Diamond and Khemani, 2005). This paper concludes that an IFMIS 
should be implemented as part of a wider set of public financial management reforms. 
The IFMIS will require clear government commitment, support and significant resources. 
It should also be phased over a number of years when current and interim arrangements 
will still be required. Even if these recommendations are implemented, a government 
implementing an IF MIS can expect 'a long implementation path, and one that involves 
significant challenges. It will be a complex learning process for all concerned. A number 
of difficulties are likely to be encountered en route' (Diamond and Khemani, 2005, p.27). 
6. SUGGESTIONS FORA WAY FORWARD 
In this section we examine possible ways to assist governments of the Global South in 
their efforts to improve their use of information systems and accounting technologies, 
suggesting that local experts should take control to rebuild public sector financial man-
agement. 
The international financial institutions and aid agencies may adopt suitable strategic 
objectives, but these are not necessarily properly implemented. They are used only as 
slogans and are not seriously used as a guide to action. Thus the following ideas have 
been correctly promoted in recent years to guide public financial management reform, 
but have not been delivered in practice: 
• country ownership; 
• getting the basics right; 
• sequencing of reform. 
If we accept the arguments of the previous sections, then public financial manage-
ment was relatively successful, but became degraded in many governments of the Global 
South as a result of events beyond the control of these governments. In these circum-
stances, what these countries need is a rebuilding and refinement of their public financial 
management systems rather than the root-and-branch reform suggested by such mega-
reforms as the MTEF and IFMIS. This should be led by the countries concerned and, 
specifically, their financial managers, who are the only experts on these systems. 
6.1 Country Ownership 
Country ownership has been widely accepted and considered vital for the success of 
large-scale public financial management reforms, especially since the OEeD's Paris 
Declaration was adopted by over 100 ministers, heads of agencies and other senior offi-
cials in 2005. This agreement committed the donors to 'Respect partner country leader-
ship and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it' (OECD, 2005). 
The report to the follow-up meeting in Accra, Ghana in October 2008 reinforced this 
view, noting that: 
Country ownership and leadership are critical to success, Even when external pressures or 
internal crisis are the main triggers PFM reforms, the starting point for real reform must be a 
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country-owned response to such pressure in the form of a program of reform and a country-owned 
structure for managing the reform process. (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 2008, p. l7) 
This report also noted that: 
The literature on PFM is replete with stories of failed reforms that were driven by donors rather 
than led by the country; such reforms may initially appear to be successful, but they are unlikely 
to be sustained and, in the worst cases, may be reversed after the withdrawal of donor support. 
(Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 2008, pp. 18- 19) 
Despite these harsh warnings, the Declaration claims that it is the responsibility of 
each government in the Global South 'to take leadership of its development processes ' 
(Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 2008, p.4), rather than the international financial 
institutions and aid agencies, as the most powerful partners, having the responsibility to 
ensure that governments of the Global South are allowed to control their own destinies. 
In practice the international financial institutions and aid agencies (led by the IMF 
and the World Bank) maintain close control over the public financial reforms. Most 
public financial management projects which are funded by World Bank loans will have 
originated from a World Bank report. In addition, many aid projects are also micro-
managed by the aid agencies; for example, all contracts let under World Bank funded 
projects for public financial management reform have to be screened by World Bank 
officials to receive a 'no objection' clearance before the contract can be awarded. In addi-
tion, the contracts may be managed by independent agencies and periodically reviewed 
by World Bank officials. 
As a former senior official of the IMF and World Bank said at an IMF seminar in 
October 2008: 'There is little or no country ownership. MTEF is often pushed on to 
reluctant countries by donor agencies.' Despite this approach, the World Bank, for 
example, still has a tendency to blame the relevant country rather than the particular 
tools it has promoted. So in 1998 the World Bank said that 'advocates continue to 
suggest that the failure of these performance-orientated tools [an aspect of the MTEF] 
or techniques have been in implementation rather than in concept' (World Bank, 1998, 
p . 16). Over a decade later at a World Bank seminar Allen Schick was still claiming that 
'the widespread failure of MTEF has been due to the way it has been implemented, not 
because of a design flaw' (Schick, 2008). 
Foucault argued that political rationalities prescribe solutions and ways to achieve 
these prescriptions while at the same time presenting these solutions as the truth. The 
prescription 9f ways and means does not necessarily mean that political rationalities 
would be achieved in practice. Instead, political rationalities are congenitally failing, 
with their implementation the commencement of the search for ever new ways of govern-
ing a sphere (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose and Miller, 1992). 
The World Bank employs public financial management advisors in most aid-dependent 
countries, directly provides or supports a range of training initiatives for public financial 
management officials, and produces a range of publications relating to particular coun-
tries or of more general interest. Co-operative bodies for public financial management 
officials, for example AFROSAI-E (for auditors general), CABRI (for budget officials) 
and ESAAG (for accountants general), are dependent on the aid agencies for support 
and for the provision of international speakers for their events. All these activities tend 
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to increase the influence of the international financial institutions and the aid agencies. 
In addition, these bodies are able to recruit leading public sector financial managers and 
officials. For example, the former federal minister of finance of Nigeria worked for the 
World Bank before and after her term in office; the current president of Liberia worked 
for the World Bank; the head of public sector financial reform in Sierra Leone went on 
to work for the World Bank; and the auditor general of Uganda had a spell working for 
the PEF A Secretariat before returning to Uganda. 
The standard approach to evaluating the quality of public financial management in 
the Global South is now the PEF A framework. These have been undertaken in over 
100 countries, with particularly high coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa (PEFA Secretariat 
at the 2009 International Consortium of Governmental Financial Management Miami 
Conference). However, very few of these assessments were undertaken with the active 
involvement of the public sector officials of the country under review. Most are led by 
the World Bank or the EU and involve international consultants. The auditor general of 
Uganda did undertake a PEFA-type review in 2007, but this was criticized by the PEFA 
Secretariat, as it was uncertain whether the donors would accept it as part of their fiduci-
aryassessments. 
6.2 Getting the Basics Right 
Public financial management reform should clearly be based on firm foundations; we 
have to 'get the basics right', to use Allen Schick's often repeated (and then ignored) 
phrase. Specifically, Schick has called for the need to 'operate a reliable accounting 
~ystem before installing an integrated financial management system' (World Bank, 1998) 
and 'focusing on the credibility of the annual budget before introducing a medium-term 
perspective to budget planning' (Schick, 2008). 
Despite these wise words, governments have been encouraged to adopt the MTEF 
and IFMIS before basic internal financial controls have been brought up to an adequate 
standard. As an IMF working paper noted, 'MTEFs have sometimes been introduced 
prematurely, in the sense that annual budget outcomes and monitoring mechanisms 
were still quite primitive, resulting in outer-year scenarios that were inconsistent with 
actual budget outcomes and/or the macroeconomic framework' (Lienert and Feridoun, 
2001). 
Schiavo-Campo (2008, p. 7) warned against MTEF and IFMIS being seen as the 
basic approaches to financial management for all governments, national and local: 'The 
"reform" momentum is still at work, however. Especially troublesome is the notion 
of extending the MTEF to general government, requiring sub-national entities to go 
through the exercise - as currently envisaged in some countries, e.g., Tanzania.' 
This is also the case in Nigeria, where both the World Bank and the Department for 
International Development (UK) are supporting public sector reforms in a number of 
state governments. The MTEF is seen as a key part of these reforms (at least by the 
donors), although PEFA indicators for basic internal financial controls are poor. 
Somalia is well known for not having had a functioning national government for 
nearly two ~cades. Despite this, a World Bank mission to Somalia in late 2007 led to 
the recommendation to introduce an IFMIS. This is despite Schick's recommendation to 
ensure that manual systems are working well before an IFMIS is introduced. Similarly, 
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donor-supported IFMISs have been implemented in several other post-conflict coun-
tries, including Liberia (Kumar and Brar, 2008), Sierra Leone and Southern Sudan. 
6.3 Sequencing of Reform 
Sequencing of public sector financial reforms is clearly important and may be another 
way of ensuring that basic internal financial controls are refined before wide-ranging 
mega-reforms such as the MTBF and IMFIS are implemented. But this approach 
may also be based on the assumption that donors know what is needed and it is just a 
question of moving there in small, easy steps. Thus the Department for International 
Development (UK) describes this type of approach as follows: 
The platform approach aims to implement a package of measures or activities designed to 
achieve increasing levels ('platforms') of PFMA competence over a manageable timeframe. 
Each platform establishes a clear basis for launching to the next, based on the premise that a 
certain level of PFMA competence is required to enable further progress to take place. (DflD, 
2005, p.l) 
This approach assumes that donors know what is needed, that the main attributes of 
sound public financial management are well understood and that all countries should 
achieve this common goal. It is just a question of determining where on the develop-
ment ladder a particular country finds itself to indicate what the next steps should be. 
However, reality is more complex. There is a variety of different approaches to public 
financial management, and each country and organization has, to a greater or lesser 
extent, developed its own approach. 'The rush for reforms, especially when driven from 
outside, has often wreaked havoc in vital institutions that societies had created either 
to foster national unity, defend disadvantaged groups and regions or support national 
investments' (Larbi, 2006, p. 3). 
We have to start from a clear understanding of the particular priorities, demands, 
history and culture of each country, elements which local public financial managers are 
best able to understand. We then have to consider carefully how existing systems may be 
rebuilt, improved and refined in the light of local experience, informed, as appropriate, 
by the lessons and experience of other countries. 
Some experiences with implementation suggest that, to reduce the risk involved in 
developing an IFMIS, it may be preferable for the system to be implemented in stages 
with, for example, the implementation of a computerized payments and budget monitor-
ing system in the ministry of finance as a first stage and the extension to line ministries as 
the second stage, and only after the system has proved to be working effectively should 
its use by regional andlor local government be considered. An incremental approach is 
suggested by Peterson (2007): 
Both the Ethiopian and Tanzania experience with automating financial systems demonstrate 
the value of a modular approach and the need to selectively not comprehensively address core 
deficiencies of financial control- fixing the hole(s) in the whole. They both involved extensive 
customization to meet user requirements. They both put into question the need for 'high end' 
commercial off-the-shelf systems which are expensive, complex, difficult to customize and 
have features which have little or no use for the current or foreseeable needs of a government. 
(Peterson, 2007, p.40) 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The economies of many countries in the Global South went into deep decline from the 
mid- to late 1970s with the associated rise in government debt. This was largely due to 
external events: the increased price of oil, increased interest rates and declining prices for 
their exports. These were events which governments had little or no control over and for 
which they were not responsible. However, it did mean that their income was severely 
curtailed. As a result, they were encouraged by the IMF, World Bank and aid agencies 
to restructure their economies, corporatize and/or privatize key sectors of the economy, 
adopt Western accounting procedures and systems, reduce the number of their public 
servants and in many cases significantly reduce their level of pay. This clearly had a 
detrimental effect on the quality of public services, including financial management and 
overall governance. 
Of course, if the developing countries had solved all of their own problems better, if they had 
more honest governments, less influential special interests, more efficient firms, better educated 
workers - if, in fact, they did not suffer from all the afflictions of being poor - they could have 
managed this unfair and dysfunctional globalisation better. (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 58) 
However, these events have given the World Bank and aid agencies the power, 
through aid conditionality, to influence significantly the public sector financial manage-
ment reforms which were introduced. This has often been through the use of, usually 
European, consultants paid significantly more than the financial managers they are 
retained to advise. 
Public sector financial managers, far from being the cause of this decline, have in many 
cases struggled to try to maintain standards whilst suffering redundancies, forced retire-
ments and dramatic cuts in their living standards. In addition, their morale has been 
undermined. 
Global solutions do not necessarily satisfy local needs. The evidence of the previous 
sections demonstrate the failure of systems and procedures imported and implemented 
by 'experts' who may not appreciate the local history, society or culture of the countries 
in which they are sent to operate. The great e~pectations of the 'solutions' often result in 
expensive failures. 
Costly failures have demonstrated that - as any other institutional reform - successful intro-
duction of a programmatic MTEF takes years of persistent efforts consistent with capacity, 
resources, awareness, incentives, and institutional realities. The two ingredients of the approach 
are therefore gradualism and selectivity, and the main conditions of success are simplicity and 
communication. If prematurely introduced or badly implemented, a formal and detailed pro-
grammatic MTEF causes enormous waste, frustration, and illusion - for trivial or non-existent 
benefits. The same is true of the informatics infrastructure for public financial management. 
(Schiavo-Campo, 2008, p. 26) 
The authors argue that it is better to build on and enhance existing public financial 
management capacity, to nourish it and facilitate its development. The local officials 
are the international experts for the systems they are responsible for managing. For 
any systems the experts are the local officials. No consultant from outside the sector or 
country can know or understand the system as well as the public sector officials who 
have bl 
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have been managing the system for years, often in very difficult circumstances. These 
arose as a result of external events beyond their control or that of their governments. All 
public financial management reforms should be led by the relevant officials and should 
be subject to informed local political support. 
Complex systems and reforms are always more risky than simple approaches. The 
authors believe that it is better to ensure that proposed reforms are kept as simple as 
possible. 
'International best practice' has to be adapted to make it fit local conditions: inter-
national best practice is never the complete answer. 
The authors would also argue for the importance of making sure that actual inter-
national best practice is being adopted and checking to ensure that the particular aspects 
really have been tried and tested and have been proved to be successful. Multi-year 
budget frameworks and programme budgeting may be good ideas, but they have been 
difficult to implement in practice. The UK tried for 30 years until 1997 to implement 
a three-year budget framework, and it is not clear that the current arrangements will 
survive the recent international financial turmoil. France only implemented its current 
approach to programme budgeting from 2006 and is only implementing a three-year 
budget framework with effect from 2008. The US government does not have an MTEF. 
There are many other examples of reforms which were once heavily promoted by aid 
agencies and international consultants which time then showed were either mistaken or 
carried significant additional associated costs. 
It would appear that the World Bank and the IMF are now slowly revising their 
support for mega-reforms such as the MTEF and IFMIS. In 2008 both organizations 
held significant seminars reviewing the evidence for the success (or more commonly 
failure) of such reforms. 
However, there is still a long way to go. We need to gain widespread recognition that 
the governance and financial management problems suffered by many countries arose 
from global events over which they and their governments had little or no control. The 
international financial institutions and the donor agencies need to ensure that they use 
their financial power judiciously to enable public financial managers to take real leader-
ship of their reform agenda. 
The change agenda arising from the world recession and the election of Barack Obama 
as the US president on a programme of change should help this process. We need a move 
away from mega-reforms such as the MTEF and IFMIS. Public financial managers need 
to be provided with the political support and necessary resources to implement basic 
tried and tested reforms. 
The World Bank says it is working for a world free of poverty. However, its prescrip-
tions for public sector financial management are unlikely to achieve this ideal. The far 
more modest aims of the Millennium Development Goals are also now, as a consequence 
of the global recession, not likely to be achieved. The private sector free market approach 
of neoliberal and NPM reforms has failed. We need to change direction and build 
poverty reduction strategies on the firm foundations of redistributing resources from the 
richer to the poorer sectors of society through the use of progressive taxation and public 
services provided free at the point of use. 
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